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Volume 8 - Number 2 | July 2024

CEO power and stock price crash risk in India: the moderating effect of insider trades

Ankita Kalia

25/08/2024 21 4 0
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CEO power Corporate governance Stock price crash risk Insider trades India.

Abstract:

Purpose
This study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.

Design/methodology/approach
A study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.

Findings
Stakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.

Originality/value
This study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.

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