Tạp chí đã xuất bản
2004
ISSN
ISSN 2615-9813
ISSN (số cũ) 1859-3682

SỐ 194 | THÁNG 5/2022

Tác động của điều tiết ngân hàng lên ổn định ngân hàng: Bằng chứng từ các nước đang phát triển

Phạm Thị Thúy Diễm

Tóm tắt:

Sử dụng ước lượng moment tổng quát hệ thống hai bước (SGMM), bài viết điều tra tác động của điều tiết ngân hàng (ĐTNH) lên ổn định ngân hàng (OĐNH) (được đo lường bằng chỉ số Z-scores của ngân hàng) ở 26 nước đang phát triển trước, trong và sau cuộc khủng hoảng tài chính toàn cầu 2007–2008. Các bằng chứng thực nghiệm cho thấy, ĐTNH càng nghiêm ngặt không có tác động đáng kể lên OĐNH nhưng không phải ở tất cả các khía cạnh của điều tiết. Cụ thể, giới hạn tổng thể các hoạt động ngân hàng có ảnh hưởng tiêu cực đáng kể và có ý nghĩa thống kê lên OĐNH. Bên cạnh đó, một số biến kiểm soát cũng có tác động đáng kể lên OĐNH ở các nước đang phát triển bao gồm chỉ số giảm phát GDP, độ mở tài chính, chất lượng thể chế và sự tương tác giữa độ mở tài chính và chất lượng thể chế.

 

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Effects of Banking Regulations on Bank Stability: Evidence from Developing Countries

Abstract:

Using the two-step system generalized method of moments (SGMM) estimation, this paper examines the influences of banking regulations on bank stability (measured by the  banks’  Z-scores) across a broad selection of 26 developing countries before, during, and after the global financial crisis 2007–2008. The empirical results suggest that stricter banking regulations have no significant impact on bank stability but not all dimensions of banking regulation matter. In particular, overall restrictions on banking activities has a statistically significant and negative impact on bank stability. Besides, some control variables influence significantly the bank stability including GDP deflator, financial openness, institutional quality, and interaction between financial openness and institutional quality.