Tóm tắt:

Tài liệu tham khảo:

1. Arellano, m., & bond, s. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), 277-297.
2. Arellano, m., & bover, o. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
3. Arrow, k. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation. The analysis and evaluation of public expenditure: the ppb system, 1, 59-73.
4. Arrow, k. J. (1985). The potentials and limits of the market in resource allocation. In issues in contemporary microeconomics and welfare (pp. 107-124). Palgrave macmillan, london.
5. Barth, j. R., caprio jr, g., & levine, r. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: what works best? Journal of financial intermediation, 13(2), 205-248.
6. Barth, j. R., dopico, l. G., nolle, d. E., & wilcox, j. A. (2002). Bank safety and soundness and the structure of bank supervision: a cross‐country analysis. International review of finance, 3(3‐4), 163-188.
7. Barth, j. R., nolle, d. E., phumiwasana, t., & yago, g. (2003). A cross‐country analysis of the bank supervisory framework and bank performance. Financial markets, institutions & instruments, 12(2), 67-120.
8. Barth, j., caprio, g., & levine, r. (2012). The evolution and impact of bank regulations. Policy research working paper series.
9. Barth, j. R., caprio jr, g., & levine, r. (2001). Bank regulation and supervision: what works best? In 13th annual world bank conference on development economics, washington, dc, may (pp. 1-2).
10. Bator, f. M. (1958). The anatomy of market failure. The quarterly journal of economics, 72(3), 351-379.
11. Becker, g. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. The quarterly journal of economics, 98(3), 371-400.
12. Becker, g. S. (1985a). Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs. Journal of public economics, 28(3), 329-347.
13. Becker, g. S. (1985b). Pressure groups and political behavior. Capitalism and democracy: schumpeter revisited, 120-135.
14. Blum, j. (1999). Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking? Journal of banking & finance, 23(5), 755-771.
15. Blundell, r., & bond, s. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
16. Boyd, j. H., & runkle, d. E. (1993). Size and performance of banking firms: testing the predictions of theory. Journal of monetary economics, 31(1), 47-67.
17. Chinn, m. D., & ito, h. (2006). What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions. Journal of development economics, 81(1), 163-192.
18. Čihák, m., & podpiera, r. (2008). Integrated financial supervision: which model? The north american journal of economics and finance, 19(2), 135-152.
19. Čihák, m., demirgüç-kunt, a., martinez peria, m.s. & mohseni-cheraghlou, a. (2012). Bank regulation and supervision around the world: a crisis update. World bank policy research working paper, no. 6286. World bank, washington, dc. © world bank. Https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12159 license: cc by 3.0 igo.
20. Claessens, s., & klingebiel, d. (2001). Competition and scope of activities in financial services. The world bank research observer, 16(1), 19-40.
21. Demaestri, e. C., & guerrero, f. (2003). The rationale for integrating financial supervision in latin america and the caribbean. Inter-american development bank.
22. Demirgüç-kunt, a., & huizinga, h. (1999). Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence. The world bank economic review, 13(2), 379-408.
23. Demirgüç-kunt, a., & huizinga, h. (2000). Financial structure and bank profitability. Available at ssrn 632501.
24. Demirgüç-kunt, a., & huizinga, h. (2010). Bank activity and funding strategies: the impact on risk and returns. Journal of financial economics, 98(3), 626-650.
25. Demirgüç-kunt, a., detragiache, e., & tressel, t. (2008). Banking on the principles: compliance with basel core principles and bank soundness. Journal of financial intermediation, 17(4), 511-542.
26. Dewatripont, m., & tirole, j. (1994). The prudential regulation of banks (no. 2013/9539). Ulb--universite libre de bruxelles.
27. Djankov, s., la porta, r., lopez-de-silanes, f., & shleifer, a. (2002). The regulation of entry. The quarterly journal of economics, 117(1), 1-37.
28. Doumpos, m., gaganis, c., & pasiouras, f. (2015). Central bank independence, financial supervision structure and bank soundness: an empirical analysis around the crisis. Journal of banking & finance, 61(s1), s69-s83.
29. Fernández, a. I., gonzález, f., & suárez, n. (2013). How do bank competition, regulation, and institutions shape the real effect of banking crises? International evidence. Journal of international money and finance, vol. 33(2013), 19-40.
30. Gaganis, c., & pasiouras, f. (2013). Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: international evidence. Journal of banking & finance, 37(12), 5463-5475.
31. Ito, h. (2006). Financial development and financial liberalization in asia: thresholds, institutions and the sequence of liberalization. The north american journal of economics and finance, 17(3), 303-327.
32. Kaminsky, g. L., & reinhart, c. M. (1999). The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. American economic review, 89(3), 473-500.
33. Kaufmann, d., kraay, a., & mastruzzi, m. (2004). Governance matters iii: governance indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The world bank economic review, 18(2), 253-287.
34. Keeley, m. C., & furlong, f. T. (1990). A reexamination of mean-variance analysis of bank capital regulation. Journal of banking & finance, 14(1), 69-84.
35. Klomp, j., & de haan, j. (2009). Central bank independence and financial instability. Journal of financial stability, 5(4), 321-338.
36. Klomp, j., & de haan, j. (2012). Banking risk and regulation: does one size fit all? Journal of banking & finance, 36(12), 3197-3212.
37. Klomp, j., & de haan, j. (2015). Bank regulation and financial fragility in developing countries: does bank structure matter? Review of development finance, 5(2), 82-90.
38. Koehn, m., & santomero, a. M. (1980). Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. The journal of finance, 35(5), 1235-1244.
39. La porta, r., lopez-de-silanes, f., shleifer, a., & vishny, r. (1999). The quality of government. The journal of law, economics, and organization, 15(1), 222-279.
40. Laeven, l., & levine, r. (2006). Corporate governance, regulation, and bank risk taking. World bank mimeo, 4, 124-136. Http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0304- 405x(09)00081-6.
41. Laeven, l., & levine, r. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of financial economics, 93(2), 259-275.
42. Lawson, j., barnes, s., & sollie, m. (2009). Financial market stability in the european union: enhancing regulation and supervision. Oecd economic department working papers, (670), 0_1.
43. Lee, t. H., & chih, s. H. (2013). Does financial regulation affect the profit efficiency and risk of banks? Evidence from china's commercial banks. The north american journal of economics and finance, 26, 705-724. Https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2013.05.005.
44. Lepetit, l., & strobel, f. (2015). Bank insolvency risk and z-score measures: a refinement. Finance research letters, 13(c), 214-224.
45. Mishkin, f. S. (2007). The economics of money, banking, and financial markets. Pearson education.
46. Nguyen, v. H. T., & boateng, a. (2015). An analysis of involuntary excess reserves, monetary policy and risk-taking behaviour of chinese banks. International review of financial analysis, vol. 37(2015), 63-72.
47. Peltzman, s. (1976). Towards a more general theory of regulation. Journal of law and economics, 19(2), 211-240.
48. Porta, r. L., lopez-de-silanes, f., shleifer, a., & vishny, r. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of political economy, 106(6), 1113-1155.
49. Posner, r. A. (1974). Theories of economic regulation. Bell journal of economics, 5(2), 335-358.
50. Quintyn, m., & taylor, m. W. (2003). Regulatory and supervisory independence and financial stability. Cesifo economic studies, 49(2), 259-294.
51. Roodman, d. (2009). How to do xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system gmm in stata. Stata journal, 9(1), 86-136.
52. Roy, a. D. (1952). Safety first and the holding of assets. Econometrica: journal of the econometric society, 20(3), 431-449.
53. Schaeck, k., cihak, m., maechler, a., & stolz, s. (2011). Who disciplines bank managers? Review of finance, 16(1), 197-243.
54. Shubik, m. (1970). On different methods for allocating resources. Kyklos, 23(2), 332-337.
55. Stigler, g. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The bell journal of economics and management science, 2(1), 3-21.

Abstract:

DOI: https://doi.org/10.63065/ajeb.vn.2022.194.80018